我看了2021年巴菲特写给股东的信。

频道:股票配资 日期: 浏览:2583

,伯克希尔哈撒韦公司发布了2020的年报。当然而今我不再持有伯克希尔的股票了,然则对我来讲,巴菲特的股东信依然是必读的。我读完14页的股东信今后,把我感觉有意思的文字摘抄了出来,放在文后分享给大年夜家。举荐英文好的朋侪们阅读完全版的股东信全文,一定会有更直接的感到。

2020年是一个非同平常的年份。经济停摆,人心惶遽。我依然记得2020年5月,伯克希尔的股东大年夜会初次搬到线上。没有芒格,大年夜家都坐在电脑前,看着90多岁的巴菲特孤伶伶(其实还有一两个高管)坐在那边,拿着一瓶可乐,用最简单朴质的ppt,奉劝大年夜家不要做空美国(never bet against America)。

本年这份股东信里,巴菲特几近没有再谈论疫情,看来经济确乎是清醒了。本年的股东大年夜会依然是在线上由雅虎直播。好在此次地址改在了洛杉矶,查理芒格也终究可以露面了。

伯克希尔具有美国最大年夜的铁路公司BNSF。在承受疫情重创的2020年,BNSF的货物运输量只下滑了7%,而利润率甚至提高了2.9%,确切了不起。巴菲特当然减持了一点点苹果的股票,然则依然具有苹果公司5.4%的股权,而且被巴菲特盛赞为伯克希尔的“四颗明珠”之一(其他三颗划分是全资具有的保险、铁路、能源营业)。

有时刻判定一小我的立场,不但要看他做了甚么,一样要看他没做甚么。伯克希尔重仓的苹果公司,2020年涨幅83%,而巴菲特只是减持了一点点,却保存了绝大年夜部分的股权。当然略有卖出,然则由于苹果的回购,而今伯克希尔的苹果股权甚至逾越了2018年建仓终了时的5.2%。面临高涨的股价,巴菲特几近没有卖出苹果,这就是他的选择。

这封股东信,就像之前的每封信一样,布满了老实、负责和礼让,让读者太平、宁神、甚至感动。巴菲特做完概述今后,起首就具体阐清楚明晰本身犯的弊端(高价买入PCC公司)。而且直言,PCC的办理层做得异常好,失足的不是他们而是巴菲特本身。

巴菲特用很长的篇幅,介绍(实际上是重申)伯克希尔的合资人文化。我能看出,他对投资人的信赖异常器重。巴菲特从刚最早办理基金的时刻,就允诺要把客户的钱看成本身的钱一样看待。他确切是这么做的,而且一做就是一生。这就是我最尊敬巴菲特的处所——不是他过人的聪明,更不是巨额的财富,而是坦诚、天职、扎实、礼让、真诚、负责的为人。我不止一次说过,价值投资不只是一个投资的方式论,更是一套完全的价值不雅。知行合一,天职老实,绝不但仅是在股票生意业务上,而是在为人处事的各个方面。证券从业者都知道一个词——“受托人责任”(fiduciary duty),巴菲特就是这个词最好的注脚。

以下为我本身摘选的原文,和在Deepl机械翻译的根本上略作调剂的中文翻译:

- No one misled me in any way – I was simply too optimistic about PCC's normalized profit potential. Last year, my miscalculation was laid bare by adverse developments throughout the aerospace industry, PCC's most important source of customers.

没有人在任何方面误导我——我只是对PCC的正常化利润潜力过于乐不雅。客岁,全部航空航天业的困局证清楚明晰我的弊端,而航空航天业是PCC最主要的客户来历。

- I believe I was right in concluding that PCC would, over time, earn good returns on the net tangible assets deployed in its operations. I was wrong, however, in judging the average amount of future earnings and, consequently, wrong in my calculation of the proper price to pay for the business.

PCC is far from my first error of that sort. But it's a big one.

我相信我的结论是正确的,即随着时候的推移,PCC在其营业中布置的有形资产净值将获得优越的回报。然则,我在判定将来收益的平均数额时,却犯了弊端,是以,我在较量争论该营业的合理代价时,也犯了弊端。

PCC远不是我第一次犯如许的弊端。但这是一个很大年夜的弊端。

- "Investing illusions can continue for a surprisingly long time. Wall Street loves the fees that deal-making generates, and the press loves the stories that colorful promoters provide. At a point, also, the soaring price of a promoted stock can itself become the 'proof' that an illusion is reality."

投资空想可以延续使人惊奇的长时候。华尔街爱好生意业务带来的费用,媒体爱好卖方的超卓炫酷的故事。在某一时刻,被推销的股票代价的飙升本身也会成为空想是实际的“证据”。

- Eventually, of course, the party ends, and many business “emperors” are found to have no clothes. Financial history is replete with the names of famous conglomerateurs who were initially lionized as business geniuses by journalists, analysts and investment bankers, but whose creations ended up as business junkyards.

当然,会议究竟会结束,而很多贸易 "皇帝 "会被人发现,他们其实根蒂没穿衣服。金融史上充溢着一些有名的企业主的名字,他们曾被记者、申明师和投资银内行誉为贸易天才,但他们的缔造究竟成为贸易垃圾场。

- Risky loans, however, are not the answer to inadequate interest rates.

然则,高收益债券(垃圾债)其实不克不及解决低利率的问题。

- The math of repurchases grinds away slowly, but can be powerful over time. The process offers a simple way for investors to own an ever-expanding portion of exceptional businesses.

回购的影响堆集得很慢,但随着时候的推移,可以阐扬强大年夜的感化。这个历程为投资者供应了一个简单的方式,使他们可以或许具有不休扩大年夜的优异企业的一部分。

- Our unwavering conclusion: Never bet against America.

我们从不摆荡的不雅点:永久不要做空美国。

- Neither of us had any institutional investors, and very few of our partners were financially sophisticated. The people who joined our ventures simply trusted us to treat their money as we treated our own. These individuals – either intuitively or by relying on the advice of friends – correctly concluded that Charlie and I had an extreme aversion to permanent loss of capital and that we would not have accepted their money unless we expected to do reasonably well with it.

我们没有任何机构投资者,我们的合作伙伴中也很少有财力雄厚的人。到场我们企业的人只是相信我们会像看待本身的钱一样看待他们的钱。这些人——不管是凭直觉照样依托朋侪的建议--都正确地判定,查理和我对本钱的永久性损失落极为反感,除非我们认为我们可以把这些钱用得相当好,不然我们不会接管他们的钱。

- Therefore, the 1983 annual report - up front - laid out Berkshire's “major business principles.” The first principle began: “Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership.” That defined our relationship in 1983; it defines it today. Charlie and I – and our directors as well – believe this dictum will serve Berkshire well for many decades to come.

是以,在1983年度申报的最前面,我们提出了伯克希尔的 "主要经营原则"。第一条原则是如许写的:"当然我们的形式是企业,但我们的立场是合作关系。" 这句话在1983年界说了我们的关系,它今天也一样成立。查理和我,还有我们的董事们,相信这句话仍将在将来的几十年里为伯克希尔处事。

- All of that said, Charlie and I would be less than human if we did not feel a special kinship with our fifth bucket: the million-plus individual investors who simply trust us to represent their interests, whatever the future may bring. They have joined us with no intent to leave, adopting a mindset similar to that held by our original partners. Indeed, many investors from our partnership years, and/or their descendants, remain substantial owners of Berkshire.

说到这里,查理和我假如不合弊端我们的第五个投资者群体感应特别的豪情亲切,那我们就不是人了:那就是一百多万小我投资者,他们只是相信:不管将来会产生甚么,我们都能代表他们的优点。他们到场我们后,并没有分开的筹算,接纳的心态与我们本来的合资人近似。事实上,很多我们合资期间的投资者和/或他们的昆裔,依然是伯克希尔公司的主要所有者。

- Could it be that Berkshire ownership fosters longevity?

岂非是伯克希尔的所有权培养了长命?

- When seats open up at Berkshire - and we hope they are few - we want them to be occupied by newcomers who understand and desire what we offer. After decades of management, Charlie and I remain unable to promise results. We can and do, however, pledge to treat you as partners.

And so, too, will our successors.

当伯克希尔呈现空位时——我们希望空位不多——我们希望这些空位被那些体会并渴望我们供应的处事的新人所具有。颠末几十年的办理,查理和我依然没法允诺后果。然则,我们可以、也确切允诺把你们看成合作伙伴。

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